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Mara
these calls of the inner self 
are worse than the deepest stone dungeon 
and as long as they are locked 
all your revolution remains 
only a prison mutiny 
to be put down by corrupted fellow prisoners. 
Peter Weiss, Marat/Sade 
INTRODUCTION 
Restorative Justice is a philosophical and programmatic alternative to the 
goals and procedures which characterize the present-day criminal justice 
system. The primary site for restorative justice is not a court of law, a 
prison cell, a boot-camp, or an execution chamber. it is a mediated 
encounter between those directly involved in or affected by the crime: the 
victim, the offender, family members, and community representatives. The 
principal aim of these encounters is to facilitate the following three 
processes: 
O Reconciliation: where the victim and offender--in the social 
rituals of apology and forgiveness --(i) offer and receive the value and 
respect owed in virtue of their intrinsic human dignity and worth, and (ii) 
engage in a mutual condemnation of the criminal act, whilst ceremonially 
‘casting off‘ or decertifying the offender’s deviant or blameworthy moral 
status. 
’ Reparation: where the offender takes due responsibility for the 
crime by ‘making good’ the material harm done to the victim: that is, by 
agreeing to provide a fair and mutually acceptable form of restitution and/ 
or compensation. 
And, as an ongoing consequence of reconciliation and reparation: 
’ Transformation: where the individuals and communities 
concerned experience some degree of liberation from the conditions that 
perpetuate the cycle of violence, aggression, and domination exemplified 
in criminal behavior: for example, by overcoming the negative emotions of 
humiliation, fear and hatred, and by advancing the alleviation of various 
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forms of  degradation, oppression and stigmatization which characterize 
socio-political structures and interpersonal relations. 
THE CRITIQUE OF RETRIBUTIVISM 
The theory of restorative justice centers its critique of the present criminal 
justice system on what it sees as the ‘internal problematic’ of the  theory of 
retributivist justice. Most retributivists would tend not to locate any 
‘unsolved problem’ in their core values and principles: whatever else is 
wrong with the theory, they might say, the ‘just deserts’ principle is 
philosophically sound. However, almost every retributivist is deeply 
troubled by current attempts to apply this principle within the current 
criminal justice system. For example, a convicted criminal is called a 
“client,” rather than “the person to be punished,” an “inmate” rather than 
a “prisoner,” judges do  not sentence a person to “pain,” but to various 
“measures,” and there is little discussion of the “core phenomena,” 
namely, the penalties themselves. There are no descriptions of what 
punishments feel like, how much they hurt, the suffering and the sorrow 
experienced by the prisoner, the harmful effects that his imprisonment 
may have on his family and loved ones. 
The theory of restorative justice does not begin its critique of 
retributivism with an abstract analysis of various philosophical or legal 
theories of punishment. I t  does not, in other words, accept attempts to 
draw clean distinctions between the philosophical plausibility of the 
retiributivist theory, and the ethical status of the practices i t  has inspired 
and the condition of the lives it has affected. On the restorative view, 
advocates of a theory of justice must show that its values and normative 
prescriptions might be successfully implemented in this world, in [his 
socioeconomic context, with this set of economic, educational, race, and 
gender inequities, in this politically driven bureaucracy. I n  abstraction, 
the retributivist principle of deserved punishments is beautifully simple 
and compelling. But as soon as one attempts to provide a map of how the 
principle might be embodied in social and experiential reality, one is faced 
with criminals who never quite fit the juridical model of the rational, 
autonomous individual; and the imposition of punishment never quite 
seems to leave the sharp-edged, unambiguous impression that the human 
suffering and pain thereby inflicted on the individual is precisely what he 
or she deserved. 
THE BASIS FOR RECONCILIATION 
It is in  its self-conscious attempt to ensure that its core values are indeed 
situated in social and experiential reality, that the theory of restorative 
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Derek R. Brookes 25 
justice transcends the retributivist theory. The human dimensions 
involved in the operational objectives of Restorative Justice therefore 
demand the highest quality of program design and staff training (Marshall 
& Merry, 1990: 104). Specifically, victim-offender encounters must be 
designed, facilitated and evaluated in such a way as to ensure that they 
are clearly oriented toward the accomplishment of Restorative Justice-in 
all its richness and complexity. In this paper, I argue that this desideratum 
has yet to be fully realized in existing Restorative Justice programs, in 
particular, with regard to the facilitation of reconciliation. 
1 begin by presenting the chief problems associated with the 
concentration on reparation in Restorative Justice programs, to the 
neglect of reconciliation. I then argue that this phenomenon is, in part, a 
consequence of (i) the almost universal use of service-delivery criteria in 
the evaluation of Restorative Justice programs, and (ii) the absence of 
research on the interactional processes involved within the victim- 
offender encounter itself, using suitably designed methodological tools. 
RE-VICTIMIZATION 
A commonly reported feature of victim-offender encounters is that their 
structure, content, mediator orientation, and evaluative criteria are 
dominated by the goal ofreparation (Gehm, 1990: 179; Van Ness & Strong, 
1997: 7 1 ; Retzinger & Scheff, 1996: 3 17). Without denying its essential 
role, (Marshall & Merry, 1990: 100; Davis et.al., 1992: 457) this 
concentration on reparation has led to several counter-restorative 
outcomes. First, a restitution or compensation agreement may achieve 
the restoration of equity; but if the offender remains hostile, unrepentant, 
and disrespectful, then the victim may view the settlement with 
resentment, dissatisfaction, and a sense of arbitrariness (Marshall & 
Merry, 1990: 98). Umbreit’s study found that some victims did not find the 
mediation “lielpful,” due to the “negative, non-repentant attitude of their 
specific offender. ‘ I  felt he wasn’t owning up to it.’ ‘He just slouched all 
the way down, and just sat and half-heartedly gave answers’.’’ (Umbreit, 
1990: 56) 
Second, the offender may regard the reparation not as an 
expression of his remorse, his desire to “make things right,” but rather as 
a punitive or retributive measure (Blagg, 1985; Marshall & Merry, 1990: 
99). Indeed, both parties are likely to leave not only with their stigmatized 
statuses of “victim” and “offender” reinforced, but now with additional 
nuances: the offender might now regard the victim as the “privileged 
avenger,” and himself as a “victim” of the justice system. Even the social 
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punitive (Blagg, 1985, quoted in Daviset.al., 1992: 143). The victim may 
see herself as having been re-victimized by the process, and the 
unrepentant offender as “irredeemably evil.” These are precisely the 
kinds of experiences which characterize the existing criminal justice 
process, and which victim-offender encounters were designed to avoid or 
ameliorate. 
AVOIDANCE OF “HARD CASES” 
Restorative Justice advocates often argue that victim-offender encoun- 
ters should be restricted to property offenses, burglaries, and other 
“minor” crimes (Conrad, 1990:320; Marshall & Merry, 1990: 3). There are 
several explanations for this restriction. First, it is often thought that some 
crimes are so “heinous” or damaging to the person, that any apology, no 
matter how sincere, would be contemptuous, even repulsive; likewise, the 
suggestion that victims ought to forgive crimes of rape, incest or murder 
would seem callous in the extreme, and may only increase their suffering 
and magnify the violation they feel (Tavuchis, 199 1 :21). 
Second, it may be thought that, in such cases, no amount of 
reparation could conceivably compensate for the harm done; and any 
attempt to suggest that it could is, again, likely to perpetuate and amplify 
the harm (Marshall & Walpole, 1985: 46; Reeves, 1989:47; Hudson, 
1990:274). This view is not, in itself, inconsistent with the perspective that 
an exclusive focus on reconciliation, in such cases, would be the 
appropriate restorative response. However, if a Restorative Justice 
program has designed the basic structure of its victim-offender 
encounters so as to be oriented toward the primary objective of reaching 
a reparation agreement, then it might tend to shy away from encounters 
which, due to the nature of the crime, would fail to satisfy their chief 
desideratum (Marshall & Merry, 1990: 179; Umbreit, 1994: 58) .  
Third, the neglect of serious cases, may be due to severe 
theoretical limitations in the restorative conceptualization of crime. The 
retributivist theory of criminal justice is sometimes criticized on the 
grounds that “the dangerous offender” or “the heinous crime” is taken as 
the base-line standard or norm for dealing with all crimes. The result of 
this limitation is that long-term incarceration, with its dual restraining and 
condemnatory function, has become the punishment of choice, regardless 
of its appropriateness in individual cases (Zehr, 1990: 1 SO). However, 
some restorative theoreticians may have reacted by simplifying the base- 
line norm in the opposite extreme, that is, by designing normative 
procedures for responding to crime which are based upon the kind of 
petty offense performed by an adolescent living in a white, suburban, 
middle class, church-going, and otherwise loving family. This is no 
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Derek R. Brookes 27 
hyperbole: taking the ‘family model’ as the norm is explicit i n  much o f the  
restorative literature (Braithwaite, 1989: 56). 
Fourth, Restorative Justice programs often acknowledge the 
importance (and the possibility) of reconciliation in the more serious 
cases; but then argue that a victim-offender encounter may not be the 
most appropriate process to accomplish this end. The hostility and 
vengefulness of the victim, coupled with the coldness or indifference of 
the offender, would be such that any confrontation would only eracerbate 
the “ill-feeling” or “raise the temperature” (Marshall & Merry, 1990: 19 1 ; 
Dongier & Doosselaere, 1992: 507-8) Umbreit reports the following 
explanations given by victims who chose not to participate: “ I  didn’t want 
to see h i m  because 1 would get mad.” “This kid is so terrible and mean . . . 
flipping me off. . . I didn’t want to ever see this jerk” (1 994: 58) However, 
this response betrays a conceptualization of the reconciliation process as 
akin to the relatively quick and cool-headed negotiation of a restitution 
settlement (Gronfors, 1992: 423). It may be that reconciliation, in some 
cases, is comparatively swift and painless. But, as Marshall and Merry 
suggest, it is precisely those parties who exhibit intense hostility or 
cynical indifference that may be in the greatest need of  a skillfully 
mediated victim-offender encounter if they are ever to achieve genuine 
reconciliation. 
Victim fear and anger are often given as reasons for not 
going ahead with mediation. Obviously one does not 
want to precipitate a violent episode, but such feelings, 
if not too extreme, can be dealt with by a properly skilled 
mediator. They are coped with all the time in divorce me- 
diation. Strong feelings may have a greater capacity for 
impressing the offender if channeled in a constructive 
way. They may mean there is more to resolve and hence 
more to achieve. . . Most of the meetings we have docu- 
mented have not been pitched at a high emotional level, 
and the victims involved, at least by the time the meeting 
took place, were not feeling overwhelming despair or 
anger. They were more inconvenienced than traumatized. 
This may be partly a matter of case-selection, partly a 
matter of timing. As a result we have yet to see the full 
power of mediation between victim and offenders, or to 
see this tested out, except in  a few atypical cases 
(Marshall & Merry, 1990: 183). 
Fifth, it may be argued that victims who display considerable 
“hurt, anger or anxiety” would be “emotionally unprepared for a 
confrontation with their offender.” In other words, a victim-offender 
encounter, under such conditions, would create a high risk of 
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revictimization-“harming victims through making demands with which 
they could not cope.” But it does not follow straightforwardly that victims 
should, for this reason, be denied access to an encounter; rather victims 
should, in such cases, be provided with “the support and preparation that 
would enable them to take advantage of the mediation process, to turn it 
to their best interests” (Marshall & Merry, 1990: 246). 
However, this provision of additional “support and preparation” 
must be strongly qualified: the actual encounter between victim and 
offender must, even in the more difficult cases, be regarded as thepriniary 
site for achieving the goals of Restorative Justice. For example, mediators 
may take very seriously the task of eliciting genuine remorse in the 
offender, but then do all of the facilitory work prior to the meeting (Davis 
et.al., 1992: 95,98). The inevitable result is that the ritual ofapology, when 
finally performed within the mediation session, comes across as highly 
rehearsed, superficial and perfunctory--as if in a formal court hearing 
(Davis et.al., 1992: 157); and the full potential ofthe encounter for eliciting 
a dynamic, powerful, and genuinely healing interaction is thereby lost. 
The one feature which makes the victim-offender encounter a unique, 
non-reproducible alternative, is exchanged for the safe haven of 
predictability (Davis et.al., 1992: 155). 
Finally, Restorative Justice programs might concede all this, and 
yet argue that the long-term commitment required to facilitate the process 
of  reconciliation in such cases, would exceed the resources of typical 
victim-offender programs. Take, for example, Marshall and Merry’s 
recommendation: 
Where complex and long-standing relationship problems 
were involved it would seem better to concentrate on 
relatively simple points of disagreement, usually pertain- 
ing to the comniission of the offence, on which some 
kind of settlement in the short term is feasible. More fun- 
damental reconciliation in such cases would involve 
longer-term counseling of each party separately, involv- 
ing an escalation of effort beyond that which is economi- 
cally feasible. It seems more sensible for schemes to take 
as their aim the facilitation of short term engagement be- 
tween estranged parties in order to provide a construc- 
tive platform for the development of future relations, 
rather than take responsibility for trying to reconcile par- 
ties in more diffuse terms. The experience of mediation 
itself may provide people with the reorientation of atti- 
tudes and skills to make progress of their own accord. 
Ultimately that is, in any case, the only sound founda- 
tion for a successful relationship: one cannot always be 
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Derek R. Brookes 29 
seeking out a mediator to sort out every little difficulty! 
(Marshall & Merry, 1990: 227) 
This argument, however, is a non seqziiturt in those cases where 
an encounter on its own is sufficient to provide the skills and elicit the 
desire for “private” reconciliation, or where the difficulty is, indeed, 
‘‘little,’’ then there would be no need for longer-term commitment by the 
program. But these are not the cases at issue here. As Marshall and Merry 
acknowledge, the more extreme forms of estrangement will require 
ongoing, intensive support-from a variety of resources-if any kind of  
reconciliation is to be achieved. 
The question at issue, then, is this: if reconciliation is regarded as 
a primary social good, a good without which individuals are likely to be 
consumed by hatred or guilt, or grow cold with cynicism and indifference; 
if there is clear evidence that, without a mediated encounter or ongoing 
community support, both victim and offender will continue in a state of 
alienation from each other and from society, then, to dismiss such cases 
as “too hard” or “too expensive” is not only indicative of a failure to take 
seriously the primary goal of Restorative Justice, but also a failure of 
social conscience and human compassion (Peachey, 1990: 556; Trenczek, 
1990: 120). 
SERVICE-DELIVERY EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
One explanation for the concentration on reparation, and the ambivalence 
about casting reconciliation as a primary goal, might be found in the 
methodologies typically used to evaluate restorative programs. The 
majority of published (and unpublished) evaluative research has focused 
almost exclusively on the socrcil service features of victim-offender 
encounters. A good example of the service-delivery evaluative framework 
i s M ark U m b re it ’ s “t w 0- and- o n e - h a 1 f- y ear s t 11 d y of v i c t i m - o ffe n d er 
mediation programs i n  California, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Texas. 
Without wishing to deny its value, the study’s research questions were 
evidently designed to evaluate the satisfaction of one or more o f the  three 
types of social service criteria ( I  994: 3 1-32). In other words, the evaluative 
criteria of this research has typically been restricted to delivery efficiency 
(e.g. costs per case), effort (e.g. caseloads per mediator), and outcotne 
(e.g. percentage of agreements, satisfaction of disputants, restitution 
compliance rates) (Lowry, 1993: 1 1  7). I select Umbreit largely because his 
research methodology is both well-known and representative of the 
majority of research on victim-offender mediation. 
There are several reasons for this restriction. First, to justify their 
existence and funding, victim-offender programs have appealed to the 





t r  
" "  
"lit "  t r   
s
 t 
pport-from  sources-if 
li ti  
   i ti  
 
 t  
it    






 liati   
 
ia r 
.   




 1 - ).  
 
. , .  m
. 
, : . [s l
  
   i .  
,   
i   
30 Humanity & Society, Volume 22, Nurnbcr I ,  February 1998 
Merry, 1990: 16-1 7): victim-offender encounters are advanced as 
preferable alternatives to the traditional criminal justice process on the 
grounds that (i) they will decrease court caseloads, the prison inmate 
population, and recidivism rates; and (ii) they will increase the percentage 
of restitution settlements and victim/offender satisfaction. 
Second, most of the data relevant to service-delivery criteria is 
comparatively easy to collect: minimal requirements for program 
management will involve keeping records of costs per case, caseloads, 
referral sources, types of cases, percentage of settlements reached, and, 
with a little more effort, percentage of restitution compliance and 
participant satisfaction. Third, it is, as a consequence, relatively cheaper 
to produce program evaluations using service-delivery data. Finally, the 
audience for which these evaluations are primarily designed-funding 
agencies, policy makers, and criminal justice professionals-do not 
generally require, and would not necessarily appreciate or acknowledge 
more qualitative or substantive data (Lowry, 1993: 1 19; Marshall & Merry, 
1990: 3 I ,  25) 
The problem with this restriction, however, is that even if these 
criteria were shown to be satisfied, such an evaluation would tell us 
almost nothing about the more substantive claims made for victim- 
offender encounters (Wright, 1991: 537): how would we know, on the 
basis of service-delivery data, whether a particular encounter has, indeed, 
“given participants access to a higher quality of justice,” “evoked 
genuine remorse in the offender,” “enabled the victim to overcome her 
resentment, fear and negative self-identity,” “repaired the social bonds”, 
“shamed the offender within a continuum of love and respect,” 
“decertified his deviant status,” and so on? And until such information is 
forthcoming--that is, in non-anecdotal form-there remains little basis for 
the claim that victim-offender encounters are theoretically grounded in 
the social and experiential reality of its participants (Umbreit, 1994: 6). 
Take the criterion of agreement percentages. This is perhaps the 
most widely used source of evidence for the success of victim-offender 
encounters. But what does the fact of an agreement tell us about the more 
substantive issues? First, if the parties have agreed to participate in a 
mediation session, they will already be sufficiently motivated to achieve 
some kind of  settlement. Second, an agreement may vary to an enormous 
degree in terms of its significance for the participants; and this may be 
impossible to determine by reference either to the fact of an agreement or 
to its content. For example, the “settlement” may involve a simple 
apology, substantial monetary restitution, a signed pledge to perform 
community service, an agreement to have nothing to do with each another 
from this point on, and so forth. The problem is that any one of these 
forms of reparation may represent a substantial breakthrough in  terms of 









  igned-funding 
l --do 
 
: ;  
:   
  
  , 
    
t rs :  
,  , , 
"   " "
   ," "    
" " "
"   "
" t "    
,  r -th re  
   
 : . 
   
  
t rs.   
     
 
  s 
     r  
   t   
  le,  " "   l  
l ,    
      
  ,   t .   on
s     
Derek R. Brookcs 31 
reconciliation. On the other hand, the agreements may be token offerings 
to “get the thing over with” lacking any reconciliatory purpose. In sum, an 
encounter might be classified as “a success” on service-delivery grounds, 
and yet fail entirely to accomplish the primary goal of Restorative Justice. 
Alternatively, it may be classed as a “failure’ due to the lack of any 
significant reparation settlement, and yet the participants may have 
nevertheless experienced reconciliation (Marshall & Merry, 1990: 30). 
It might be argued that political and financial constraints demand 
that the evaluation of victim-offender programs be construed within the 
service-delivery framework. This would not prevent mediators from 
pursuing the goal of reconciliation; but this further aim should not be 
construed-at least not publicly-as a primary objective or as an 
indicator of success. A good example of this strategy is Umbreit’s 
“Sample Victim Information Letter”; In the letter, various reasons are 
given for why the victim might wish to participate in a mediation session: 
[Rleceive answers to questions about the offense that 
only the offender can provide”; “express your frustra- 
tion and concerns directly to the person who should hear 
them--the offender”; “become directly involved in the 
sentence your offender receives, rather than sitting on 
the sidelines”; “determine the amount and form of  resti- 
tution to cover your losses through a structured meeting 
with the offender, in the presence of a trained mediator 
(Umbreit, 1994: 207). 
On the basis of this list, it would be difficult for the victim to 
avoid the impression that the primary goal of the meeting is personal 
retribution and mediator-assisted reparation: victims are promised an 
opportunity to direct their negative emotions against the offender, to 
become personally involved in determining his punishment, and to 
negotiate a settlement to recover their losses. The terms “apology”, 
“forgiveness,” “reconciliation,” and the like, are never mentioned-and 
deliberately so, i t  seems. A “Note to Program Staff,” located beneath the 
sample, reads: “Be aware that the word “reconciliation” can push buttons 
and irritate some victims and many victim advocates” (Umbreit, 1994: 207). 
Now Umbreit explicitly upholds reconciliation as the fundamental 
goal ofvictim-offender mediation (Umbreit, 1994: 363). But then, to entice 
victims to participate without faithfully representing the primary goal is 
highly questionable-even if the ultimate outcome is reconciliation 
(Centomani & Dighera, 1992: 363). To do so by evoking attitudes, desires, 
and emotions which constitute the driving force behind that very 
paradigm of justice to which it is most strongly opposed, is 
straightforwardly disingenuous (Davis et.al., 1992: 92). 
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Aside from the moral question, the problem with this strategy is 
that, in the long term, it will fail to achieve widespread acceptance of 
victim-offender encounters as a genuinely distinct alternative to the 
traditional criminal justice system. As Marshall and Merry suggest: 
[I]f an innovation is to be acceptable as social policy, 
there must [among other things] . . . be a feeling that the 
provision of such services is obligatory upon society. . . 
. In the [case of victim-offender mediation, research] would 
have to be able to demonstrate that the gains to victims 
from meeting their offenders were sufficiently substan- 
tial to encourage the growth of public feeling that such 
opportunities must be provided as of right ((Marshall & 
Merry, 1990: 3 1 ). 
But if the only evaluative research available is based upon 
criteria which could be equally well satisfied by existing social services or 
the civil law, then it is very hard to see how policy makers and the public 
are to be persuaded that this innovation should be accepted as social 
policy-particularly given the opposition it already faces from the 
dominant values of the  current criminal justice system (Marshall & Merry, 
1990: 3 1). 
POST HOC EVALUATIVE DATA 
A second possible explanation for the ambivalence about reconciliation 
may lie i n  the methodological tools used to evaluate the mediation 
process. The ma-jority of research on victim-offender encounters has 
concentrated on determining the impact of certain variables-such as the 
seriousness of the offence, mediator training, participant gender, race, 
age, and educa t ion -n  various outcomes. Most of the data for this 
research consists either of transcriptions of audio-recordings or post hoc 
interviews and observer field notes, which are then interpreted, 
categorized and presented in narrative or statistical form (Pate, 1990: 141; 
Umbreit, 1994; Leibrich, 1994). 
The problem with this approach, however, is that these variables are 
situated within a highly complex sequence of interactional events. Their role 
in the mediation process-not to be identified with their role in the craft of 
post hoc narration--cannot therefore be explained unless they are examined 
as lhey occur in the confext ofthe unfolding rnteruction. This is not to 
suggest that post hoc reports or interviews are of no value. But their 
significance is strictly limited to the understanding they provide of post- 
mediation experiences: for example, the long-term effect ofthe encounter, the 
evolution of negative memories, the problems which arise due to inadequate 
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Derek R. Brookes 33 
follow-up ( Marshall & Merry, 1990: 145, 147). Less charitably, they give 
us-above all-some degree of insight into the subjective ‘‘lens,’’ the 
analytical imagination and the narration skills ofthe researcher. Note the vast 
distance between the mediation event as it actually occurs, and the event as 
constructedfor the reuder in the following description: 
Four composite observations of mediation sessions will 
be presented i n  order to display a range of case examples 
involved in the mediation process. A qualitative analy- 
sis of the observations will then be presented, including 
a number of dangers and pitfalls. The four examples were 
constructed through identifying common characteristics 
among the total number of mediated sessions that were 
observed. Statements by participants that are presented 
in these examples are based on the actual mediations 
that were observed, although they are paraphrased 
(Umbreit, 1994, 119). 
For example, take the following descriptions provided by various 
research studies. The first appears to be construed as a successful 
apology-forgiveness sequence; the second as an apology which elicits an 
affective response of some kind, perhaps forgiveness; the third appears 
to be “heard” as an insincere apology; and the fourth is construed as a 
heavily coached apology, with questionable effect. 
Michael [the mediator] explained the reason for coming 
and then asked Mark to make his apologies. Somewhat 
cowed, Mark made a rushed and awkward statement -- 
“Yeah, well, it was nothing persona1,just happened to be 
your car-and I’m sorry.” Mr. Sytnes thanked him for the 
apology (Marshall & Merry, 1994: 54). 
The stepfather points out to the offender that things 
could have been worse. ‘You could have put out an eye; 
you could have blinded her.’ ‘ I  know. I know. That’s why 
we were so scared,’ the offender moans. ‘I’m sorry it 
happened. I t  was stupid.’ Both mothers are visibly moved 
by Brian’s comments (Umbreit, 1994: 121). 
After the breakdown of the system of justifications, 
Gerhard unexpectedly and long-windedly apologizes for 
his behavior. This, however, is questioned by the social 
worker since Gerhard did not avert the clash but instead 
also kicked the victim, who had already been knocked to 
the ground (Messmer, 1990: 67). 
.  
 : , ).  , 
s-above ll-some     "le " 
  
s, 
/ a  






   
 




 " "  ;  
. 
 
" l,   
r-and '  "  m  
 : . 
  
'  ; 
' ' . 1 . '
 ' ' '  
' 





, : ). 
34 Humanity & Society, Volurne 22, Number I, February 1998 
We are ushered into the office of the Chief Ambulance 
Officer. He asks Gary [a juvenile offender] to sit rather 
than stand, perhaps wishing to avoid any impression of 
this being a dressing-down.-- David [a police sergeant]: 
‘‘I think you have something to say to the officer, Gary.”- 
Gary mumbles what is presumably an apology. The Of- 
ficer, apparently satisfied with Gary’s effort, and rather 
embarrassed, says: “Fine, fine, I’m not here to tell you 
off because I realize you will have had your ear bent like 
that already’ (Davis et.al., 1992: 56-7). 
With only these post hoc narrations as evidence of the 
exchanges, we have no way of validating the researchers’ interpretations 
of the events---e.g. “somewhat cowed,” “awkward,” “visibly moved,” 
“moan s , ” “ 1 on g- w in d e d I y , ” “ p re s u m a b I y an ap o 1 o g y , ” “ e in b arrasse d ,” 
and so on. Nor can we determine the sequence of emotions, tones of 
voice, the interactional organization, or any other significant micro- 
feature of the events, that might enable us to explain or understand the 
reconciliation process in anything but the most rudimentary fashion. 
And we cannot rely instead upon studies of apology and 
forgiveness, as they occur in other contexts. Most studies of apology or 
forgiveness have either been based upon philosophical or religious 
reflection, or, like the evaluation of victim-offender encounters, have 
relied almost entirely upon post hoc data: that is, using questionnaires or 
interviews with the individuals concerned (or their therapists), narrations 
of psychotherapy case studies, psychotherapeutic or psychological 
constructions and discussions of relevant techniques, literary 
descriptions (fictional or historical), hypothetical role-plays or contrived 
incidents, post hoc records and linguistic analyses of trivial one-to-one 
remedial interchanges, or one-to-many public orations. N o  research study 
has yet examined the rituals of apology and forgiveness, as they actually 
occur, between criminal offenders and victims, within the setting of a 
mediated encounter. 
In sum, research based upon post hoc evaluative data has not 
provided us with sufficiently reliable empirical evidence to support the 
more substantive claims made for victim-offender encounters: we know 
almost nothing of the interactional processes by which victim and 
offender mutually create a restitution agreement or perform the rituals of 
apology and forgiveness, or liberate one another from their stigmatized 
statuses of “victim” or “offender,” and so on. Although Messiner used 
transcripts of audiotaped mediation conversations in order to “interpret 
the course of negotiation procedures between social worker, victim and 
offender”( 1990: 47 1 -72), the results suffer from brevity, narrowness of 
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focus, and lack of reader-access to the original transcripts. As a 
consequence, Restorative Justice programs do  not have adequate 
conceptual or methodological tools for coherent, systemic and empirically 
grounded mediator training and program design. Finally, the reliance on 
post hoc data has failed to provide the main stakeholders-funding 
agencies, policy makers, the general public, victims, offenders and their 
families-with anything but the vaguest, anecdotal understanding of the 
unique benefits of the victim-offender encounters, and the processes they 
are designed to facilitate (Marshall & Merry, 1990: 26; Messmer & Otto, 
1992: 8). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, it is clear that the design and operation of 
Restorative Justice programs must be grounded upon a detailed 
theoretical and empirical study of the interactional processes involved in 
the social rituals of apology and forgiveness, as they occur within the 
context of victim-offender encounters. It is also clear that this kind of 
research has yet to be performed. 
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